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Abstract 
Governmental positions are a powerful predictor of European treaty reforms. Yet, few empirical 
studies analyze the conditionalies between positions over different issues or conflict dimensions. If 
governmental positions are conditional upon the real or expected outcome on other issues, the 
sequence of decisions becomes increasingly important for our understanding of European treaty 
reforms. So far, not many studies analyze the sequence of intergovernmental decisions. 
In the present paper, I argue that governmental preferences over the reform of the EU decision rule 
dependent  on  the  delegation  of  competences  to  the  EU  and  vice  versa.  Moreover,  I  present  a 
statistical model which allows for estimating this conditionality. Subsequently, I apply this model to 
an extensive data set of reform positions revealed by national governments at the Intergovernmental 
Conferences (IGC) 2003/4. Next, I analyze the sequence of decision taken by this particular IGC in 
chronological order. For this purpose, I predict the change of governmental position in response to 
the decisions over subsets of issues and I compare these predictions to public statements issued by 
governmental leaders at the time. Finally, I discuss the implications for our understanding of the 
intergovernmental bargaining outcome.  
   2 
Introduction 
The intergovernmental standard approach to European treaty reform follows three steps. First, a 
task-force or delegation of experts sets the reform agenda.  Second, the Council presidency resolves 
the less contentious issues via bilateral shuttle diplomacy or preliminary meetings of the responsible 
ministers. Third, the most controversial issues are saved for negotiation at the final summit. The 
Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC) of Amsterdam and Nice followed this procedure. Both times 
governments agreed on reforms at the least common denominator (Yataganas 2001; Baldwin et al. 
2001; Finke 2009a). The Amsterdam IGC produced the infamous “Amsterdam-leftovers” pertaining to 
institutional  reforms.  The  Nice  IGC,  widely  considered  the  last  attempt  to  ensure  efficient  and 
effective decision making before enlargement, failed to deliver crucial reforms (Heinemann 2003). 
Tony Blair summarized the generally pessimistic appraisal of the Nice Treaty as follows: “As far as 
Europe is concerned we cannot do business like this in the future” (BBC News, 11 December 2000). 
  One year later the European Council at Laeken suggested an encompassing revision of the 
Nice  Treaty  (Giering  2003:  6).  Acknowledging  the  failure  of  the  standard  approach,  the  Council 
suggested a novel method to prepare the next IGC and invoked the Convention on the Future of 
Europe. The plan was to overcome the intergovernmental stalemate by broadening the political 
discussion and involve representatives of national parliaments, the European Parliament (EP), elder 
statesmen and academics. As regards the outcome, the Convention lived up to these expectations by 
presenting a coherent and progressive proposal for a “Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe”.  
Technically the subsequent IGC could have altered each and every article, but de facto the 
masters of the treaties agreed on a very short list of modifications. Most important, they lifted the 
QMV threshold up to 55% of the member states and 65% of the EU's population;
1 they delayed the 
reduction of the number of Commissioners to the year 2014 instead of 2009 and they weakened the 
role of the Commission President in the appointment of the Commissioners (Milton et al. 2005: 51; 
König et al. 2008). Subsequently, the No-vote of the French and Dutch voters cau sed ratification 
failure, fo9llowed by a two year period of reflection. Finally, in October 2007 the 27 heads of state 
and government agreed on a mitigated version, now referred to as the Lisbon Treaty
2. This time the 
Irish voters hanged the ratification process when rejecting the Lisbon Treaty in June 2008. 
  Against this background I analyze the IGC which convened from October 2003 until June 
2004. In particular, I raise the question why and how governments agreed on a relatively progressive 
treaty reform which caused lasting difficulties for the domestic ratification processes. What explains 
                                                           
1The draft Constitution suggested 50% of the member states and 60% of the EU's population. 
2Essentially the Lisbon Treaty drops any reference to and symbols of a fully f ledged constitution. Furthermore, it provides 
the possibility for opt-outs from the Charter of Fundamental Rights and from Justice and Police Cooperation and delays 
the reform of the Council voting rules (König et al. 2008). 3 
the de facto agenda setting power of the Convention? Why did some governments even sign the 
reform treaty although they preferred the status quo under the Treaty of Nice?  I answer these 
questions in three steps. First, I identify  the two most important patterns of intergovernmental 
conflict.  Second,  I  estimate  the  non-separability  of  governmental  preferences  over  both  conflict 
dimensions. Third, I analyze the sequence of decision taken at the IGC 2003/4. For this purpose, I 
predict governments’ expected reaction to each intermediary decision and compare them to public 
reaction  of  governmental  leaders.  My  sequential  analysis  adds  to  our  understanding  of  the 
intergovernmental bargaining dynamics and the negotiation outcome. 
 
Literature 
When it comes to European treaty reforms, it is broadly acknowledged that governments are the 
most  relevant  actors  (Moravcsik  1998;  Slapin  2008).  Nevertheless,  intergovernmentalists  are 
criticized for their exclusive focus on governments. One group of critics argue that supranational 
institutions exert a significant influence on the outcome of European treaty reforms. In particular, 
the  Commission  and  the  EP  hold  agenda-setting  powers  and  influence  the  drafting  of  the  legal 
document by their exclusive knowledge about the EU’s decision-making mechanisms (Benedetto 
2006; Maurer 2007: 46 ff.). However, compared to the increasing importance of the Commission and 
the EP in EU legislative politics, neither of the two supranational actors possesses formal voting or 
even veto rights with regard to treaty revisions.  
 Moreover,  a  growing  body  of  literature  finds  domestic  actors  to  be  relevant  at  the 
international  bargaining  table.  These  studies  examine  the  relationship  between  domestic  and 
European levels. They argue that the unitary-actor assumption is not warranted (e.g., König and Hug 
2000; Hug and König 2002; König and Finke 2007). Their main argument concerns the ratification 
process,  and  they  maintain  that  governments  can  credibly  tie  their  own  hands  by  referring  to 
skeptical domestic ratification actors. Theoretically, these studies elaborate on Schelling’s (1960) 
“paradox of weakness”, which has been prominently discussed in the literature on two-level games 
(e.g., Pahre 1997; Iida 1993, 1996).  
Furthermore, theories differ with regard to the power ascribed to particular member states. 
Moravcsik (1998) argues that treaty reforms from Messina to Maastricht are sufficiently explained by 
analyzing the preferences of the three largest and most powerful member states (Germany, France, 
UK).  If  necessary,  these  large  countries  will  offer  either  “financial  side  payments  or  symbolic 
concessions” to the smaller ones to achieve their grand economic bargains (ibid.: 65f.). However, 
Moravcsik’s original work deals with a maximum of 12 member states. In contrast, the Northern 
(1995) and Eastern (2004/7) enlargements added another 15 small to medium-sized countries to the 4 
EU, the majority of which had relatively weak economies at the time they entered. Given this shift in 
the balance of economic power, the making of financial side payments to smaller countries appears 
to  be  a  less  feasible  strategy.  Against  this  background,  it  comes  as  little  surprise  that  recent 
researcher  on  intergovernmental  bargaining  finds  large  and  small  member  states  to  be  equally 
important for our understanding of EU treaty reforms (e.g., König and Hug 2006; Slapin 2008).  
  Moreover, intergovernmentalists perceive bargaining as “subject to essentially no procedural 
constraints”  (Moravcsik  1998:  61).  In  other  words,  treaty  reforms  are  a  result  of  pure  and 
unconstrained bargaining. This perspective is challenged by enlargement because the efficiency of 
such an unstructured intergovernmental bargaining game decreases with the number of participants. 
Furthermore, the agenda shifted from economic coordination towards institutional reforms, which 
turned out substantially more difficult to solve.  
Finally, the Convention on the Future of Europe constitutes a procedural innovation which 
not only prolonged the negotiation process, but left governments with imperfect and incomplete 
information. Specifically, the importance of the Convention was unclear in the beginning and the 
success  of  which  was  critically  dependent  upon  its  president,  Giscard  d’Estaing  (Norman  2005; 
Tsebelis  2008).  Furthermore,  the  Convention  intermingled  the  domestic  coordination  and  the 
international  negotiation  phase,  thereby  broadening  the  number  and  heterogeneity  of  relevant 
actors (Göler and Marhold 2003; König and Slapin 2006). Indeed, the analysis by Tsebelis and Proksch 
(2008) shows that the president availed himself of private information in his approach to managing 
the  Convention,  i.e.  he  left  the  delegates  uncertain  about  the  rules  of  the  game.  Finally,  the 
governments at Laeken did not expect the Convention to produce a coherent draft constitution. 
Instead they expected a report of more or less unbinding recommendations and suggestions.  
While these findings support the increasing importance of smaller countries and the fact that 
process mattered for the preparation of the IGC 2003/4, we know relatively little about the role of 
process during the IGC itself. Traditionally, negotiations take place behind closed doors hiding the 
information required by strategic bargaining theory such amendment, voting and recognition rule 
(Slapin 2008: 6). Information is available as either of two types. First, official documents which are 
issued along the way to structure the discussion safeguard intermediate compromises or reinforce 
the credibility of arguments via public commitment. Second, public statements and comments issued 
by those who attend the closed meeting. Obviously, the latter cannot be taken at face value because 
they are often issued strategically, masking actors sincere intention. Subsequently, I utilize both 
types of information plus a unique data set containing governments’ official positions over 60 of the 
most hotly contested issues (König and Hug 2006).  5 
One literature which takes process and the sequence of decision seriously is the theory of 
non-separable preferences (Enelow and Hinich 1984). As regards the IGC 2003/4 previous studies 
find that intergovernmental conflicts over European treaty reforms can be reduced to two primary 
dimensions: the level of European integration and the reform of the decision rule (Hix and Crombez 
2005;  Finke 2009a). The assumption of separable preferences implies that a government’s most 
preferred level of integration is independent of the de facto or expected design of the decision rules. 
Or, vice versa, a government’s preference over the design of EU decision rules is independent from 
the competences delegated to the EU. However, as regards European treaty reforms the assumption 
of  separable  or  unconditional  preferences  appears  to  be  unrealistic.  For  example,  France  might 
prefer deeper cooperation in justice and home affairs only if decision making in this area will become 
more efficient by extending majority voting and lowering the voting thresholds. Ireland, on the other 
hand,  might  prefer  deeper  cooperation  in  the  same  area  only  if  it  retains  its  veto  right.  One 
important consequence of this bidirectional conditionality is that it may reduce the size of the win set 
for potential reforms (Finke 2009b).  
As a consequence of non-separable preferences the sequence of decisions matters (Enelow 
and  Hinich  1984;  Lacy  2001).  Actors  will  adjust  their  ideal  position  on  one  issue  dimension  in 
response to the de facto or expected outcome on the other dimensions. Take the above examples: In 
case France encounters a far less progressive reform of the decision rule than it had originally hoped 
for, it would in response prefer less cooperation in justice and home affairs. In case Ireland has to 
face QMV applicable to justice and home affairs, it will adjust its position and reject any cooperation 
in  this  policy  area.  Accordingly,  the  theory  of  non-separable  preferences  is  considered  an 
endogenous explanation for preference changes. Below, I argue that decisions over non-separable 
dimensions of European treaty reforms had been taken consecutively. Analyzing this sequence of 
decision provides additional insights into the dynamics of intergovernmental bargaining.  
In the remainder I first present a statistical model which allows for an explicit estimation of 
the non-separability of governments’ reform preferences. Thereafter, I present the data and the 
results of my statistical estimates. Finally, I simulate governments’ conditional preferences along the 
sequence of decisions taken at the IGC 2003/4. I compare the predicted preference change to the 
public statements issued by governmental leaders after each intermediate decision.  
 
Statistical Model 
In recent years, the statistical modeling of ideal point estimation has experiences significant progress. 
Most frequently these models have been deployed to roll call votes in the US congress (e.g. Pool and 
Rosenthal 2000; Clinton et al. 2004), in the US Supreme Court (Martin and Quinn 2002; Quinn et al. 6 
2007), in the UN General assembly (Voeten 2005; Kim and Russett 1996), in the EP (Han 2007; Hix et 
al. 2007), in the Council of Ministers (Hoyland and Hagemann 2008). 
Currently  the  most  frequently  used  model  resembles  the  two-parametric  item  response 
model which has been developed in psychometrics. In this model it is assumed that each legislator 
has an ideal point   and chooses the alternative closest to this ideal point. Moreover, each issue 
(or  item)  is  assumed  to  have  a  difficulty  parameter,  ,  and  a  discrimination  parameter,  . 
Where the first captures the overall difficulty across all actors to agree to a reform proposal on issue 
j, the latter captures in how  far issue  j discriminates between the latent dimensions of a given 
proposal space. Theoretically the two- parametric item response model corresponds to the Euclidean 
voting model as follows. Let the d- dimensional conflict space be defined by the choices of i = 1, 2, . . . 
,n  actors over  j=1,2,…,m  issues and let a legislator’s preference on an alternative follow a quadratic 
utility function, then his observed choice   accords to the following latent utility calculation: 
        Yi,j
∗ = Ui 𝐬𝐪?  − Ui 𝐨?  =   𝐱 − 𝐬𝐪 ′ 𝐱 − 𝐬𝐪  + 𝗈?,? −   𝐱 − 𝐨 ′ 𝐱 − 𝐨  + 𝗎?,?       (1.1) 
  = 2 𝐨? − 𝐬𝐪? ′𝐱? − 𝐨?′𝐨?+𝐬𝐪?′𝐬𝐪? + 𝗈?,?−𝗎?,?            (1.2) 
  = −?? + 𝗃?′𝐱? + 𝗆?,?                  (1.3) 
where   denotes the reform proposal and   the status quo on issue j
3;  and   are the 
errors terms of the utility calculation
4. 
Following previous studies I expect that  the IGC 2003/4 is best characterized along two 
intergovernmental conflict dimensions, i.e. vertical integration and the decision rule. To account for 
the  potential  non -separability  between  the  two  dimensions  the  Euclidean  utility  function  is 
appended by positive semi-definite 2x2 matrix A. In the main diagonal of A (a11, a22 ≥ 0) we find the 
salience a government attaches to each of the two dimensions. The higher the value, the more 
important the dimension will be for the government’s overall utility calculation. The elements a12 
and a21 of the secondary diagonal capture the non-separability in government’s utility calculation 
over both dimensions. Formula (1.4) depicts the complete Euclidean utility function. 
                                                           
3 The extension to more than two alternatives is straightforward (Johnson and Albert 1999: 182ff.). 
4 More precisely the parameters correspond as follows (Clinton et al. 2004) :  
?? = 2 𝑜? − 𝑠𝑞? ;  −?? = 𝑜?′𝑜? + 𝑠𝑞?′𝑠𝑞?;  𝜀?,? = 𝜂?,? + 𝜈?,? 
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 Ui 𝐨?,𝐬𝐪?  =   𝐱 − 𝐬𝐪 ′𝐀 𝐱 − 𝐬𝐪  −   𝐱 − 𝐨 ′𝐀 𝐱 − 𝐨 .         (1.4) 
Most existing statistical models are built on the assumption of separable preferences, i.e., an actor’s 
choice on one issue does not depend on the collective outcome on other issues (Enelow and Hinich 
1984).  Instead,  they  assume  that  both  dimension are  equally  salient  and  separable,  hence  𝐀 =
 1 0
0 1
 . The two-dimensional Euclidean voting model with non-separable preferences transforms 
into the following model
5 (Finke 2009b): 
        Yi,j
∗ = Ui 𝐬𝐪?  − Ui 𝐨?  =   𝐱 − 𝐬𝐪 ′𝐀 𝐱 − 𝐬𝐪  + 𝗈?,? −   𝐱 − 𝐨 ′𝐀 𝐱 − 𝐨  + 𝗎?,?     (1.5) 
              = −?? + β1?x1? + β2?x2?                  (see formula 1.3) 
                   −2aix1? o1 − sq1  + 2aix2? o2 − sq2  + 2ai o1o2 − sq1sq2 +𝗈?,? − 𝗎?,?           (1.6) 
              = −?? + β1?x1? + β2?x2? + qjai + ai  β1jx2i − β2jx1i +εi,j           (1.7)
6 
where ai indicates the sole element of the secondary diagonal of the matrix A 
7. Once estimated it 
tells us in how far actor i’ s preferences are non-separable across dimensions 1 and 2. On the other 
hand qj =  o1o2 − sq1sq2  gives information about the importance of item j for the latent construct 
of non-separability.  
The theoretical benefit and challenge of this model is that non-separability conditions an 
actor’s  preferences  on  one  dimension  upon  the  outcome  of  other  dimensions.  In  the  two 
dimensional  example  the  conditional  ideal  point  on  dimension  1,  𝑥1
∗,  can  be  calculated  by  the 
following formula (Enelow and Hinich 1984): 
𝑥1
∗|𝑜2
~ = 𝑥1 −  
𝑎12
𝑎11
  𝑜2
~ − 𝑥2                    (1.8) 
Where 𝑜2
~  defines the observed outcome on the second dimension, 𝑎11 is the relative salience the 
actor attaches to dimension 1 and 𝑎12 indicates the strength and direction of the non-separability 
between  both  dimensions.  On  the  one  hand,  formula  (1.8)  provides  a  possible  explanation  for 
observed positional changes which is endogenous to the negotiation process. On the other hand, it 
                                                           
5 In a d-dimensional space the observed choices 𝑌∗ are modelled accordingly (suppressing indices over actors i and items j): 
𝑌∗ = −? + ?′𝑥 +     𝑞ℎ?𝑎ℎ? + 𝑑
?=ℎ+1
𝑑
ℎ=1 𝑎ℎ? ?ℎ𝑥? + ??𝑥ℎ  + 𝜀  
6 The two new terms bear the following intuition: ai  β1jx2i − β2jx1i  estimates in how far an actors agreement to a reform 
of item j depends on the interaction of his ideal point with the item parameter of the other dimension. The second new 
term, qjai, corrects actors i’s nonseparability for each issues j. In other words, if qjis negative it indicates that an actor with 
positive (negative) complementary preferences is less (more) likely to agree on reform of issue j.  
7 Here I assume that a 12=a21 which intuitively means “that the effect of the expected level of one policy on the marginal 
value of another is the same, regardless of which policy is fixed first. It is worth noting, that there is nothing inherent in the 
model that requires A to be symmetric.” (Hinich and Munger 1999: 216). 
 
 8 
tremendously complicates the estimation because it makes identification of the statistical model 
impossible. In any case, I am interested in how far the concept of non-separability adds to the 
explanatory power of the standard model. Therefore I suggest a two-stage estimator. The first stage 
estimates the standard two-parametric item response model. The second stage constrains the item 
and the person parameters to the values resulting from stage 1, but estimates those parameters 
capturing the effects of non-separability (ai , qj ), the item difficulty parameter and the cut-off points 
if applicable.  
This two-stage estimation process has one well-known drawback. The potential bias of the 
second stage error term must, in most cases, be considered interdependent to the error resulting 
from the first stage (e.g. Lewis and Linzer 2005). Fortunately, the MCMC framework provides a 
straightforward way to carry over the error term from the first to the second stage by simply drawing 
the item and person parameters from their posterior distribution. In other words, for estimating the 
non-separability parameters the distribution of the person and item parameters are fixed to the 
results  of  the  first  stage,  i.e.  the  posterior  distributions.  Accordingly,  the  error  terms  of  these 
distributions carry over causing larger uncertainty of the second stage estimates. Estimations of both 
stages deploy a Probit-link function and are based on 10,000 burn-in iterations and 15,000 draws 
from the posterior distribution
8.  
 
Empirical Analysis 
For the empirical analysis, I use the DOSEI data set, which contains information about member 
states’  reform  positions  on  65  of  the  most  prevalent  issues  discussed  at  the  IGC  2003/4  (for a 
description of DOSEI data gathering, see König and Hug 2006). These interview data were gathered 
from 82 experts, 47 of whom (57%) were from inside the government (König and Hug 2006). The 
questionnaire was constructed by thorough document analysis. Pretests and the high response rate 
support  the  construct  validity  of  the  questionnaire  on  the  whole  set  of  discussed  issues  (for 
methodological details of the DOSEI data, see EUP special issue, König 2005). The scale of all issues 
(items) is ordinal, with a majority of them being dichotomous, and none having more than five 
categories. Appendix A1 gives a short description of the 61 issues used for the present analysis.
9 For 
all issues in the data set, the DOSEI researchers have coded the Treaty of Nice, the Conventional 
Draft and the Constitutional Treaty as signed by the heads of state and government in October 2004. 
                                                           
8 In order to check the convergence the algorithm has been restarted several times with varying length of iterations. 
9 National governments revealed consensus on the reform of four issues, which therefore are useless for the determination 
of the latent conflict space. 9 
The standard model (first stage) correctly classifies approximately 76% of the cases, whereas 
33% of the cases would be classified correctly by chance
10. Figure 1 depicts the results of the first 
stage;  i.e.,  member  states’  ideal  positions  within  the  two-dimensional  latent  conflict  space. 
Interpretation of the intergovernmental conflict space follows that of earlier studies (see Hix and 
Crombez 2006; König and Finke 2007). According to this framework, a first conflict is defined by 
issues that alter the vertical division of competences and powers between the domestic and the 
European  level  of  government.  In  contrast,  a  second  conflict  is  defined  by  a  group  of  issues 
associated with the reform of the decision rule. Empirically, the vertical dimension in Figure 1 reveals 
large  positive  parameters  for  issues  that  refer  to  the  EU’s  political  mandates:  the  division  of 
competences,  the  employment  objective,  citizenship,  and  fundamental  rights.  The  horizontal 
dimension reveals large item parameters for issues associated with the decision rule and the internal 
distribution of power: the composition of the European Commission, instigation rules for enhanced 
cooperation, the extension of qualified majority voting, the voting threshold, voting weights, and the 
allocation  of  seats  in  the  EP.  For  a  complete  list  of  item  discrimination  parameters,  please  see 
Appendix 1. 
Next to the estimates of governments’ ideal points, Appendix 2 depicts the estimates of 
governments’ non-separability parameter 𝑎? . Overall, confidence intervals for 𝑎? turn out large in 
comparison to those for the governmental positions. But then this is not surprising given that they 
are inflated by combining the errors of the first and the second stage of the estimation. Nevertheless, 
I find the non-separability parameter significant at the 10% level in more than half of the observed 
cases. Elsewhere, I argue that large and economically powerful member states are more likely to 
reveal positive complementary preferences over the design of the decision rule and the level of 
vertical integration
11. The statistical results support this argument (Finke 2009b). 
However, in this paper I  am less interested in the origins of governments’ non-separable 
preferences, but in the consequences thereof. In particular, I analyze the role of the Convention and 
the sequence of decision taken by the subsequent IGC. Regarding the empirical evaluation of my 
theoretical  claims  I  must  decide  on  whether  or  not  the  DOSEI  data  contains  information  on 
governments’ unconditional preferences. The assumption of truly unconditional preferences would 
imply that when formulating their positions governments  and all other relevant domestic actors 
                                                           
10 For comparison: A one dimensional model correctly classifies around 58% of the cases whereas a third dimension would 
increase this number to almost 80%. 
11 Briefly summarized my argument is the following (Finke 2009b): Substantially, the conflict over the decision rule dealt 
with the veto threshold for and the applicability of QMV. Both reforms could have reduced all governments veto power 
and, as a consequence, upgraded the importance of other power resources, in particular the power of the purse. This gives 
an advantage large and affluent economies are in advantage. Therefore, governments of small and poor member states 
were less eager to give up their veto power when confronted with a higher level of integration (negative complementary), 
whereas governments from economically powerful states would press for an even lower voting threshold and an extension 
of QMV (positive complementary).   10 
ignore the status quo. This assumption  appears highly unlikely. Instead, I assume that domestic 
preference formation takes place against the background of the status-quo. In other words, I assume 
that the DOSEI data contains governments’ positions on European treaty reforms conditional upon 
the status quo. To account for this assumption I reorganize formula (1.8) such that it allows for 
calculation of the unobserved unconditional positions 𝑥1and 𝑥2 under the assumption that all actors 
attach equal salience to either of the two dimensions, i.e. 𝑎22 = 1 and 𝑎11 = 1. 
𝑥1 =
𝑎12𝑥2
∗+𝑎12
2𝑠𝑞1−𝑎12𝑠𝑞2−𝑥1
∗
 𝑎12
2−1    and 𝑥2 =
𝑎12𝑥1
∗+𝑎12
2𝑠𝑞2−𝑎12𝑠𝑞1−𝑥2
∗
 𝑎12
2−1           (1.9
12) 
Figure 2 shows these unconditional positions which differ from figure 1 in three aspects. First, one 
group  of  governments  is  located  in  the  upper  left  corner  (Greece,  Denmark,  Finland,  Austria, 
Belgium, Latvia, Czech Republic, Slovakia). These governments prefer more EU competences, but are 
eager  to  maintain  extensive  veto  rights.  Unsurprisingly,  this  group  primarily  consists  of  smaller 
countries  as  most  proposals  for  reforming  the  decision  rule  would  have  strengthened  the 
proportionality between voting power and population size. Second, the unconditional position of the 
German, French, Spanish and Portuguese governments is extremely close to the Convention proposal 
and the Constitutional Treaty. In particular, the positions of the French and German government are 
less integrationist than what they revealed in consideration of the status quo, i.e. the Treaty of Nice. 
Finally, under the assumption that all governments attach equal salience to both dimension, figure 2 
suggest that four countries should have preferred the status quo over the Constitutional Treaty: 
Ireland, Poland, Hungary and Estonia.  
  Next,  I  evaluate  governmental  positions  conditional  upon  three  decisive  steps  along  the 
process  of  intergovernmental  negotiations:  1.)  the  Convention  proposal;  2.)  the  incomplete 
compromise reached under the Italian Presidency in December 2003; 3.) the compromise reached 
ahead  of  the  final  summit  under  the  Irish  Presidency  in  2004.  First,  I  locate  the  intermediate 
decisions  of  the  IGC  within  the  two-dimensional  space.  Subsequently,  I  predict  governments’ 
positional shifts in response to the intermediate  decisions. Next, I compare governments’ public 
reactions  to  my  predictions.  Finally,  I  discuss  the  implications  of  these  dynamics  for  our 
understanding of the international negotiations over European treaty reforms. 
The Convention Proposal 
Table 1 documents the sequence of intergovernmental decisions. In particular, it sorts the 65 issues 
contained in the DOSEI data set according to their last appearance in official documents. Though 
obviously an ex-post judgment, I assume this to be the date the issues had been settled.  Table 1 
                                                           
12Here the outcome upon which governments condition their position equals the status quo, hence 𝑜1
~ = 𝑠𝑞1 and 𝑜2
~ =
𝑠𝑞2. 11 
indicates that almost half of the issues have been resolved during the Convention. Among them are 
many low conflict issues such as the rejection of an extended right of initiative for EP and national 
parliaments, the extension of the Co-decision procedure to all areas except for regional policy, the 
definition of the EU’s political objective, the general applicability of the subsidiarity principle, but also 
the definition of the Union’s competences in the fields of foreign as well education policy. Likewise, 
the limited extension of QMV to the areas of economic, currency and employment has been settled 
during the Convention. Most of these issues are last mentioned in official documents issued between 
the 12 May and 12 June 2003, just ahead of the Convention’s concluding debate on 13 June 2003.   
The  essential  question  is  in  how  far  the  Convention  proposal  altered  governments’ 
expectations over the outcome of the IGC. In technical terms this is the quest for 𝑜
~, the expected 
outcome on which a government conditions its position. Given the public statements and bilateral 
negotiations before the start of the IGC, it appears that governments had a fair idea which set of 
issues would be excluded from the intergovernmental bargaining table. Hence, the expected reform 
 𝑜
~ was located somewhere between the Treaty of Nice (“ToN”)  including the modification on the 29 
issues  already  settled  by  the  Convention  (“Jun03”)  and  the  far  reaching  Convention  proposal 
(“Conv”).  Figures  3  and  4  depict  governments’  positions  conditioned  upon  either  end  of  this 
spectrum. In particular, figure 4 shows the shift of governmental positions from being conditional 
upon the status quo (“ToN”) to being conditional upon the minimum reform as defined by the 29 
issues settled by the Convention in June 2003 (“Jun03”). The governments of Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Malta Luxembourg, Estonia and the Slovak Republic shift their position in lockstep to the location of 
the minimal compromise. By contrast, their colleagues from Denmark, Sweden, Poland, the Czech 
Republic,  Belgium,  France  and  Greece  move  in  the  exact  opposite  direction.  Moreover,  all 
governments would have preferred the minimal compromise over the Treaty of Nice, with the Irish 
being more or less indifferent.  
Yet,  the  Convention  Proposal  was  far  more  progressive.  Figure 3  presents  governmental 
positions  conditional  upon  the  Convention  Proposal  („Conv“).  Most  obviously,  the  French  and 
German governments would have preferred the complete package. Hence, it comes as little surprise 
that Schröder (“I could sign it as it is.
13”) and Chirac (“It is the best possible synthesis.
14”) were 
mutually  outbidding  each  other  in  praise  for  the  Convention’s  work.  Likewise,  the  British  Labor 
government (“A good balance which ought not be rattled.
15”) would have preferred the complete 
proposal  over  the  minimum  compromise.  The  Spanish  Prime  Minister  Aznar  and  his  Portugese 
counterpart  Barroso  restricted  their  criticism  to  the  symbolic  issues  of  adding  a  reference  to 
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Christianity in the preamble
16. Supporting figure 3 the Italian government, represented by Prime 
Minister  Berlusconi,  reacted  to  the  Convention  proposal  by  demanding  an  even  more  radical 
extension of majority voting. „We, too, would like to expand the qualified voting rule at the expense 
of unanimity. We will try to go into this direction, but we all must be pragmatic and realistic
17“. 
Many  other  member  states  reacted  less  enthusiastically  to  the  presentation  of  the 
Convention Proposal. Specifically, figure 3 implies that the governments of Austria, Latvia, Denmark, 
Sweden, Hungary, the Netherlands, Finland and Poland shifted their positions towards ‘less reform’ 
on  both  dimensions.  For  example,  the  Austrian  Chancellor  Schüssel  stated  that  his  country  had 
“fundamental  concerns”  on  several  institutional  reforms,  in  particular  the  planned  office  of  a 
permanent Council president as well as the downsizing of the Commission
18. Likewise, the Hungarian 
government repeatedly demanded to retain the "one country, one Commissioner" principle, and 
rejected any plans to distinguish between voting and non-voting Commissioners. In a joint statement 
both governments warned that the reform of the voting threshold proposed by the Convention, i.e. a 
simple majority of member states and 60 percent of the enlarged EU's population, harms the interest 
of small countries
19.  The  Dutch  Prime  Minister  Balkenende  expressed  his  concerns  that  “the 
European Council should not become the exclusive preserve of the large member states“ and should 
not  be  turned  into  „a  new  Legislative  Council“  acting  „as  the  pivot  of  the  European  legislative 
process.
20“  Along the same lines, the Finish President Halonen called for more balanced changes to 
the institutional elements of the constitution by setting limits on the powers of the European Council 
and its president. Furthermore, the Finish government openly criticized the possibility for a smaller 
group of countries to form a "core group" in defense policy
21. The Irish government declared that it 
would pursue "a few important problems in the IGC” such as the plans to harmonize criminal law, to 
create a European public prosecutor and to abolish the national vetoes on taxation
22. As regards the 
latter issue it was strongly supported by the Estonian government.  
According to  figure  3  the  Danish  and  Swedish  governments  should  have  opposed  the 
Convention Proposal most radically. They reveal the largest positional shift and should have rejected 
                                                           
16 Source: „ Saturday, From the top: how the member states' leaders view the new draft constitution“, The Times (London), 
June 21 2003. 
17 Source: „Giscard passe le témoin européen ￠ l'Italie“, Le Temps, 19 July 2003. 
18Source:  Anja  Hauser,  „Das  Gipfeltreffen  von  Thessaloniki  -  Eine  neue  Seite  der  Europäischen  Geschichte  wird 
aufgeschlagen“,  Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung  e.V.  (Hrsg.),  30.  Juni  2003.  Available  at: 
http://www.kas.de/proj/home/pub/9/1/year-2003/dokument_id-2130/index.html (3.12.2008). 
19Source: „Hungary and Austria exchange views on Constitution“, Hungarian News Agency (MTI), July 16 2003. 
20Source:  Speech  by  the  Prime  Minister,  Dr  Jan  Peter  Balkenende,  Eurocities  Conference  on  European  and  Local 
Governance,  The  Hague,  23  June  2003.  Avaialble  at:  http://www.minaz.nl/Actueel/Toespraken/2003/06/ 
Speech_by_the_Prime_Minister_Dr_Jan_Peter_Balkenende_Eurocities_Conference_on_European_and_Local_Governanc
e_The_Hague (20.12.2008). 
21Source: „From the top: how the member states' leaders view the new draft constitution“, The Times (London), June 21 
2003. 
22Source: „ From the top: how the member states' leaders view the new draft constitution“, The Times (London), June 21 
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any further integration under the proposed decision rule. Even more so, they should have rejected 
any  extension  of  majority  voting  given  the  proposed  level  of  integration.  However,  the  public 
statements  issued  by  both  governments  in  response  to  the  Convention  do  not  support  this 
prediction. The statements issued by the Danish Prime minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen read rather 
diplomatic calling the Convention proposal „impressive and very ambitious“ and a „good foundation 
for negotiations
23“. His Swedish colleague Göran Persson was also rather positive „despite the fact 
that the Swedish representatives at the Convention had been very critical“
24.  
One explanation for this lack of open criticism is the increasing pressure by their domestic 
opposition. As regards Denmark, the awareness of the upcoming referendum on the Constitutional 
Treaty  may  partly  rationalize  the  reluctance  to  criticize  the  draft.  Presenting  the  result  of  an 
uncomplicated IGC, which embraces the Convention’s results, was considered an advantage for the 
advocates of the yes-vote, i.e. the government. A similar logic might apply to Sweden, where the 
governing Social Democratic party was internally divided on many of the reform issue (Finke and 
König  2009).  Likewise,  the  Finish  government  came  under  increasing  pressure  by  the  domestic 
opposition. According to its critics, the Lipponen government had moved from the wrong assumption 
that the "real" negotiations on the new Constitutional Treaty would have been conducted in the IGC. 
In response, opposition leaders publicly challenged the Finnish government to take a more active 
role in the IGC
25.  
  In contrast to Denmark and Sweden, the Polish government pursued an entirely different 
strategy. President Kwasniewski repeatedly denounced the Convention Proposal as a decisive step 
towards a federal European super state
26. Instead of soft-pedaling international conflict to be in a 
better marketing  position domestically,  both president and government   fueled  the Euroskeptic 
movements  within  Poland  in  order  to  gain  domestic  electoral  support  and  to  improve  their 
international bargaining position. Regarding the international level  Figure 3 reveals that this was a 
credible strategy indeed. No other country‘s position was located so close to the status quo. This 
perspective culminated in the infamous battle cry „Nice or Death“ by Jan Rokita the leader of the 
conservative opposition. Specifically, the Polish government rejected any reforms which would have 
reduced the Polish veto power in the Council of Ministers. In addition, it strongly rejected any steps 
towards a European defense policy which it thought to weaken the collaboration within the NATO
27.  
                                                           
23Sources:  „Le président de la Convention a remis le projet de Constitution européenne au sommet de Salonique; Le succès 
européen de Giscard“, Le Figaro, 21 June 2003. 
24Source: Danmarks Radio P1, Copenhagen, in Danish, 1400 gmt, 20 June 2003 (text report). 
25Source: „Country Report Sweden“, The Convention Watch, available at: http://eucon.europa2004.it/ Watch2ed/Answer1-
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  Bottom  line,  the  Convention  Proposal  induced  endogenous  positional  changes  which 
polarized European governments. One group was eager to support the complete package, whereas 
another group wanted to slash down the list of reforms. In retrospective, a list of 29 issues had been 
settled once and for all by the Convention. Figure 4 indicates that all governments would have 
preferred this minimal compromise („Jun03“) over the status quo („ToN“).  
 
The Incomplete Italian Compromise 
Under the leadership of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi the Italian Council Presidency had scheduled 
the  decisive  summit  of  the  IGC  for  December  12-13,  2003.  In  preparation  of  the  summit,  the 
Presidency  issued  a  document  which  recorded  consent  over  nine  additional  issues  (table  1). 
Governments  had  agreed  to  maintain  the  current  division  of  competences  in  tax,  social  and 
agricultural  policy  as  well  as  the  voting  rule  over  social  and  defense  policies.  However,  they 
established  the  “Permanent  Structured  Cooperation”  which  allows  for  Enhanced  Cooperation  in 
security  and  defense  matters,  but  has  to  be  agreed  by  unanimity  in  the  European  Council. 
Furthermore, governments agreed on far reaching harmonization of national policies in the areas of 
migration and asylum policy and they settled on minor extensions of the European education and 
research policy. Finally, they introduced a right to withdraw membership unilaterally. Nevertheless, 
on  early  Saturday  morning  it  became  clear  that  the  summit  would  not  be  able  to  resolve  the 
remaining issues which correspond to another 23 variables of the DOSEI data set. As a consequence, 
governments agreed to postpone the negotiations to the upcoming Irish Presidency.  
  Figure  5  locates  the  incomplete  comprise  of  December  2003  („Dec03“)  in  the 
intergovernmental  conflict  space.  Furthermore,  it  depicts  my  prediction  of  how  governmental 
positions should have shifted in response. Overall, figure 5 indicates the trend observed in figures 3 
and 4. In particular, Denmark, Sweden Poland, Latvia, France, Greece and Belgium move downward, 
i.e. towards less integration. The governments of the Slovak Republic, Cyprus, Ireland, Malta and Italy 
adjust their position in the opposite direction. On the horizontal dimension the positional shifts turn 
out rather small in comparison. With the exception of the Irish government, all others would have 
preferred the incomplete compromise reached in December 2003 over the Treaty of Nice. 
  In how far do governments‘ public reactions as recorded in December 2003 correspond to 
figure  5?    The  French  and  German  government  made  no  secret  of  their  disappointment.  Both, 
Schröder and Chirac observed that the adoption of reforms was primarily blocked by a number of 
smaller states (Denmark, Sweden, Austria, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary) and, most vehemently, Poland. 
As a consequence the two leaders deployed a twofold strategy. First, they revived the idea of a core 
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Europe, a "pioneer group" of nations which could move forward with closer cooperation on areas 
such as the economy, justice and defense. According to Chirac, "It will be the motor. It will set the 
example, allow Europe to go faster, better.
28“  Second, they publicly blamed the Polish government 
for its „inflexibility“ and its unwillingness to discuss any solution of the QMV reform based on the 
principle of a double majority
29. The ultimate purpose of this double strategy was to raise the costs of 
continuous opposition or, as German chancellor Schröder had put it  in his unrivaled rhetoric, to 
initiate a „learning process“ in Warsaw
30. 
  The British Labour government confronted a situation far more complex. On the one hand, it 
would  have  welcomed  further  reforms,  in  particular  extended  applicability  and  reform  of  the 
majority rule. On the other hand, it strongly opposed any plans of a core Europe, not least because it 
believed  that  the  new  member  states  would  share  British  market  liberalism  and  oppose  future 
European regulation policies. Hence, it comes as little surprise that Tony Blair welcomed the decision 
to postpone the negotiations, arguing that it is better „to give it some time, for countries to have 
some time to find an accord.“ Britain, he continued, would continue to work towards the successful 
creation of a constitution for the European Union, despite the collapse of talks
31. The reaction of the 
conservative  Spanish  government  was  very  similar.  On  the  one  hand,  Aznar  rejected   any 
responsibility for the failed summit by highlighting his „constructive willingness to negotiate until the 
last moment“. On the other hand, he nourished the hopes that all 25 governments would find an 
agreement under the Irish presidency
32.  
  Considering figure 5 it comes as no surprise that the Portuguese government turned out very 
unsatisfied with the failure of the summit, but hoped for a coherent proposal along the outcome of 
the Convention
33. The Belgian Foreign F inister, Louis Michel, was more plain ly venting  his anger: 
„Yes, I am disappointed and angry. This decision was the first that we had to take in the EU25. Some 
had preferred national interests over those of Europe.
34“ 
  As regards Austria, the Franco-German threat of a core Europe apparently hit the mark. 
Chancellor Schüssel emphasized Austria’s commitment to being at the "heart of a new Europe" ("It's 
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in  our  interest  to  belong  to  the  core  group  of  Europe.
35“)  As  before,  the  Danish  and  Swedish 
governments were rather cautious in their public statements. However, the Danish Prime Minister 
Rasmussen did not join the critics of the Italian presidency, but complimented them on the well 
founded substantial preparation
36. His evaluation matches with figure 5, where Denmark would have 
been more or less indifferent between the 38 issues settled until December 2003 and the Treaty of 
Nice.  
  Unsurprisingly,  the  Polish  government  refused  any  responsibility  for  the  failed  summit. 
Furthermore, Prime Minister Leszek Miller threatened to continuously veto any reform which would 
reduce  Poland’s  relative  voting  power:  „We  said:  'Let  us  take  all  these  good  things  from  the 
constitutional  treaty  (the  simplification  of  treaties,  a  joint  foreign  policy,  greater  power  for  the 
European Parliament) and this one fragment from the Nice Treaty, that is the division of votes.' They 
did not agree, so as a punishment they have got all of Nice!
37"  
  In sum, the Italian Presidency pushed the compromise to the limit of what would have been 
acceptable to all governments  –  but  not  beyond.  The  Presidency  was  unable  to  reconcile  the 
polarization caused by the Convention Proposal.   
The Irish Presidency and the Constitutional Treaty 
In January 2009 the Irish government took over as Council Presidency. They scheduled the second 
summit to settle the intergovernmental dispute over the Constitution for June 17-18, 2004. Until this 
date governments agreed over eleven more issues, the majority of which had been settled at two 
meetings of the Foreign Ministers end of May 2004 (Table 1). In particular, they agreed to maintain 
the  current  division  of  competences  as  regards  health  policy.  Furthermore,  governments  finally 
rejected any extension of QMV to the area of social security rights. With regard to the appointment 
of Commissioners the new wording carefully strengthened the role of the EP
38. Furthermore, the 
compromise provided that the Commission President-elect would first select his Commissioners on 
the basis of suggestions made by the  national governments and this body should then be approved 
by the EP. Governments agreed on an extended cooperation in criminal and justice proceedings and 
that a European Public Prosecutor could be introduced at a later date, but only if all member states 
and the EP. Furthermore, they enabled mutual defense commitments among subgroups of member 
states and established a European Foreign Minister to be accountable to and appointed by the 
Commission in cooperation with the Council president, but without further approval of the EP. 
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Finally, only four days ahead of the summit, governments agreed on a preamble to include a religious 
reference, but not to Christianity.  
  Figure  6  depicts  the  location  of  this  compromise  in  the  two-dimensional  conflict  space 
(“Jun04”).  In  particular,  the  extension  of  QMV  and  the  agreement over  the  organization  of  the 
Council presidency as well as the Foreign Minister caused a significant rightwards shift. In reaction to 
these developments, governments’ adjusted their position on vertical integration. In particular, the 
positions of the Slovak, Slovenian, Cypriote, Italian, Maltese, Irish, Estonian and Spanish government 
moved  upward.  i.e.  towards  more  integration.  By  contrast,  the  Danish,  Swedish,  Polish,  Czech, 
Belgian, Greek, Finish, Dutch, Lithuanian and Latvian government moved downwards, i.e. towards 
less integration. So did the French, the German and the Portuguese government, but for a different 
reason. Whereas the former group confronted more drastic reforms of the decision rule than they 
had originally hoped for, the opposite was true for the latter three governments. Finally, the Irish 
government was about to formulate a reform package beyond a minimal compromise. In particular, 
the  compromise  which  emerged  just  ahead  of  the  final  summit  moved  beyond  what  Denmark, 
Sweden, Estonia, Latvia and Poland would have preferred to the Treaty of Nice.  
  Ultimately, the Irish Presidency provoked open resistance when launching its compromise 
proposal for the outstanding issues, in particular the reform of the QMV rules, ahead of the final 
summit.  A  qualified  majority  was  now  defined  as  at  least  55  per  cent  of  the  member-states, 
comprising at least 15 of them and representing at least 65 per cent of the EU's population. As 
compared to the provision under the Treaty of Nice the new rules would have raised the population 
threshold, at least until the EU takes in new members. Unsurprisingly, many of the smaller states felt 
being passed over by the Irish presidency. The Finish and Slovene Prime Minister called the proposal 
„unacceptable“. The Austrian chancellor seconded that this proposal were putting to much emphasis 
on population size and, in effect, strengthening the position of the larger member states
39. Poland's 
Prime Minister Marek Belka demanded that any voting rule should be responsive to the opposition of 
at least 30 per cent of the EU's population or 40 per cent of member -states. He demanded that an 
appropriate declaration should b e  added to  the treaty
40. Beside  the reform of QMV rules, the 
opposition concentrated on the proposed reform of the Commission. Here, the limit of what smaller 
member states were willing to tolerate was a declaration of intent to reassess the current size of the 
Commission in due time.  
  French President Chirac emerged as the spokesman of the larger countries. Referring to the 
compromise reached ahead of the concluding summit, he said: „From now on limits exist which we 
                                                           
39Source: Radio Slovenia, Ljubljana,  18 June 2004 (English summary). 
40Source: „We need compromises, but we don't want a dog's dinner of a document“, The Irish Times,19 June 2004. 18 
cannot  overstep.  We  will  not  accept  any  deviation  from  the  proposals  presented  by  the  Irish 
presidency.“ Naturally, this point of view was supported by the German and Italian government
41.  
By  and  large ,  the  final  summit  followed  the  P residency’s  proposal.  In  addition,  the 
Constitutional  Treaty  provided  for  a  smaller  college  of  18  Commissioners  by  the  year  2014.  It 
strengthened the involvement of the EP in the annual budgeting procedure. Moreover, governments 
concurred that a team of three member states would preside over the Council for 18 months. Each 
member of the team would hold the presidency for a period of six months, being assisted by the 
other two states on the basis of a common program. The European Council would be chaired by a 
President appointed for two and a half years appointed by unanimity of Council members, renewable 
once. Governments did not extent majority voting to foreign and tax policy, a decision particularly 
important  to  ensure  the  support  of  Ireland,  Estonia  and  Poland.  Likewise,  governments  did  not 
extent the Union’s competences in the areas of employment, social and economic policy  
Figure  7  locates  the  final  compromise,  the  Constitutional  Treaty  („IGC“),  in  the  two-
dimensional conflict space. In reaction, I predict the positions of the Slovak, Irish, Cypriote, Maltese 
and Finish government to move up and rightwards, whereas the French, Greece, Belgian, Danish, 
Swedish and Latvian governments should have moved in the opposite direction. As a result, the 
Constitutional Treaty is located very close to Portugal, Germany, France and Spain. By contrast, 
governments  of  the  following  eight  states  would  have  preferred  the  Treaty  of  Nice:  Denmark, 
Sweden, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Ireland, Austria and, though marginally, Hungary.  
 Against  this  background  it  comes  as  little  surprise  that  some  governments  hailed  the 
Constitutional Treaty, in particular the German chancellor („a historic decision which increases the 
Union’s unity and governability“
42) and the French president Chirac („a good agreement for Europe  
and a good agreement for France
43“). At the same time Chirac was careful enough to portrait the 
result as a compromise: "We, it's true, would have liked to have gone further still down the road of 
harmonization in social and fiscal areas, but of course we had to take everyone's opinions into 
account.
44“ The only government to evaluate the treaty even more euphorically was the Portuguese 
calling it „splendid for Europe“ and  „splendid for Portugal, because the fundamental interests (…) 
have been fully enshrined in the European constitution.
45“ This puff piece on the  Constitutional 
Treaty matches with the Portuguese position in Figure 7. Moreover, the statement of the British and 
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Spanish government were also very positive, with the Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero highlighting 
that the IGC had „avoided a directorate in the EU
46“.  
The eight member states which, according to figure 7, should have preferred the status quo 
can  be  subdivided  in  three  groups.  First,  some  member  states  found  it  hard  to  veto  the  final 
compromise because they had been favoring a rather integration friendly position earlier on in the 
IGC and committed themselves to the Convention Proposal. In particular, this is true for Denmark, 
Sweden, Austria and Latvia.  Accordingly, these countries found it hard to veto the Constitutional 
Treaty over reforms they supported earlier on in the process. Besides an unfavorable utility balance, 
such a veto would have created significant credibility and reputation costs. Therfore, we observe 
cautiously positive evaluations from these governments, mostly emphasizing the importance of an 
agreement as an end in itself as well as a proof of and „guarantee for efficiency after enlargement“
47. 
Second, Ireland and Estonia have been appeased by a favorable solution to a single, but vital 
issue. As low-tax countries, both governments were united in their opposition against any attempt to 
European tax harmonization or, even worse, the extension of QMV to this area (Gwiazda 2006; Finke 
2006). It appears of little help to interpret the reactions of the Irish Presidency which, naturally, 
hailed  the  final  compromise.  However,  the  Estonian  reactions  to  the  final  outcome  were 
characterized  by  relief  that  the  „red  line“  of  tax  harmonization  has  not  been  crossed.  The 
government expressed „satisfaction with the fact that an article on direct taxation was dropped from 
the Convention Proposal at the IGC and in the area of indirect taxation unanimity was preserved.(…) 
Retaining unanimity voting in the area of taxation was one of the most important issues for Estonia 
at the IGC.
48“ Indeed, table 1 reveals that the voting rule on taxation was among the last issued to be 
resolved. Accordingly, the Estonian Foreign Minister judged the final agreement to be „no doubt a 
compromise, but favorable to Estonia
49“.  
Third, the consent of Hungary and, in particular, Poland to the final outcome remains difficult 
to explain. Certainly, reputation costs are an important factor to understand the last minute consent 
of  the  Polish  government.  The  leader  of  the  Polish  Social  Democrats  stated  that  Poland  had 
"achieved  a  maximum  on  what  was  to  be  achieved".  (…)  Refusal  to  accept  a  compromise  in  a 
situation where 24 EU countries were ready to agree would have led to Poland's isolation from the 
rest of the union“
50. Another explanation points to the effect of decision sequence, in particular the 
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47Source: Per Stig Møller, „Det Genforenede Europas Traktat”, Jyllands-Posten, 10 July 2004. 
48Source:  „Convention  Watch“,  No.  1,  available  at:  www.eu-consent.net/library/EU25Watch/EU-25_Watch-No1.pdf 
(11.01.2009). 
49Source: „European Council endorses EU Constitutional Treaty“, Baltic News Service, 19 June 2004. 
50Sources: „President says Poland "moral victor" in battle for EU Constitution“, BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 21 June 2004.  
PAP news agency, Warsaw, 21 June 2004 (English summary). 20 
late  Polish  rise  at  a  time  all  other  governments  had  committed  themselves  to  the  compromise 
proposed by the Irish presidency. Besides, the Polish government had been well aware that a veto 
would not have terminated the reform process once and forever. Indeed, Prime Minister Marek 
Belka’s justified his final approval along this line of arguments: "But having derailed summits twice - 
and  that's  how  it  would  have  been  interpreted  by  circles  hostile  to  Poland  -  our  position  in 
negotiating the budget and the constitution (in another attempt) would have been very bad.
51" In 
this comment he referred to the upcoming negotiations over the multiannual financial framework 
2007-2013.  However,  the  negative  reaction  by the  Law  and  Justice  party which,  already strong, 
would provide the next president (Lech Kaczynski) and the next Prime minister (Jaroslaw Kaczynski) 
indicated potential ratification problems
52. 
Discussion 
Governmental positions are a powerful predictor of European treaty reforms (Moravcsik 1998; König 
and Hug 2006; Slapin 2008; Finke 2009a). Yet few empirical studies analyze the interdependence 
between  governmental  positions  on  different  issues  and  conflict  dimensions.  If  governmental 
positions are conditional upon the  real or expected outcome on other issues, the  sequences of 
decisions  gain  importance  for  our  understanding  of  European  Treaty  reforms.  Furthermore,  if 
positions are conditional, the winset for reforms changes along the sequence of decisions. So far, few 
studies analyze the sequence of intergovernmental decisions.  
Previous research found that the intergovernmental negotiations in 2003/4 centered around two 
dominant  conflict  dimensions,  namely  the  level  of  European  integration  and  the  design  of  the 
decision rule. In this paper, I argue that governmental preferences on both dimensions can hardly be 
conceived  independent.  By  contrast,  governments’  position  on  the  design  of  the  decision  rule 
depends on the real or expected level of integration. Vice versa, governments’ position on the level 
of integration depends on the real or expected design of the decision rule. In the first part of this 
paper,  I  analyze  the  extent  and  direction  of  this  non-separability  effect  for  the  IGC  2003/4.  
Thereafter, I analyze the sequence of decisions taken by the IGC 2003/4. In particular, I predict 
governments’ reactions to each intermediate decision and compare them to public reactions. 
First, I advance the statistical models of ideal point estimation such that they allow for an explicit 
estimation of non-separability effects (Finke 2009b). The model uses patterns of ex ante survey 
responses to draw inferences about the conditionality of member states’ preferences between two 
                                                           
51Source:  „Poland's  prime  minister  says  he  accepted  EU  constitution  to  secure  Polish  influence“,  Associated  Press 
Worldstream, 21 June 2004.  
52 Source s: „Polish opposition leader attacks EU constitution "capitulation"“, BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 19 June  2004.   
„Europe Has Constitution, But Belka is in Trouble“,  Polish News Bulletin, 21 June 2004. 
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latent, orthogonal conflict dimensions. I then apply this statistical model to data on governmental 
positions revealed at the IGC 2003/4. The results confirm that richer member states tend to reveal a 
positive complementary preference between the decision rule and the level of vertical integration 
(Finke 2009b).  
Thereafter, I provide a sequential analysis of the negotiations over the Constitutional Treaty. For 
this purpose, I simulate governments‘ positions as being conditional upon the Treaty of Nice, the 
Convention  Proposal,  the  minimal  compromise  reached  under  the  Italian  presidency  (December 
2003) and the compromise reached just ahead of the final summit in June 2004. By and large, the 
predicted  change  of  governmental  positions  matches  with  the  public  statements  issued  by 
governmental leaders at the time.  
Previous IGCs at Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2000) ended with reforms at the least common 
denominator. As a consequence, governments invoked the Convention on the Future  of Europe. 
Unexpectedly, the Convention proposed a coherent and progressive reform treaty. Retrospective 
governments considered almost half of the reform issued to be settled before starting the IGC. 
However, governments haggled over the bindingness of the Convention Proposal which polarized the 
conflict among them. One group advocated the adoption of the complete reform package, whereas a 
second group reacted by opposing further reforms altogether. The failure of the summit headed by 
Italian Council Presidency gives proof to this conflict. 
The decisions taken until December 2003 would have improved all 25 governments as compared 
to the Treaty of Nice. Yet, in the end the Irish Presidency brokered a deal which eight countries 
should have rejected. My analysis reveals that the Austrian, Danish, Swedish and Latvian government 
found  it  hard  to  revoke  their  commitment  to  vertical  integration  stipulated  by  the  Convention 
Proposal even when confronted with unfavorable reforms of the decision rule. As regards Ireland and 
Estonia the sequence of decisions matters in so far as both low-tax countries had a vital interest that 
matters of taxation would not be decided by QMV. This issue remained on the bargaining table until 
the final summit in June 2004. At the same time, the existence of vital issues reveals the limit of my 
statistical  approach.    Finally,  my  sequential  analysis  contributes  to  our  understanding  why  the 
Hungarian  and  Polish  approved  the  Constitutional Treaty.  Essentially,  both  governments  did  not 
succeed  in  forming  a  powerful  opposition  early  on  in  the  process.  In  the  end,  they  feared  the 
negative  reputational  effect  of  vetoing  the  compromise.  Moreover,  they  expected  adverse 
consequence  for  the  upcoming  negotiations over  the  EU  budget.  In  other words,  financial  side-
payments may have played an important role after all. 
  In the end, the Constitutional Treaty was almost identical to the Convention Proposal. Hence, 
it must be considered a landslide victory for the French and German as well as the Spanish and 22 
Portuguese  governments.  As  regards  the  intergovernmental  level  they  eventually  succeeded  in 
overcoming  the minimal compromises  of  Amsterdam  and  Nice.  Yet,  considering  the  subsequent 
ratification failure and the unfinished ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, it remains an open question 
whether this ‘success’ will carry over to the domestic arena. 
 
References 
Baldwin, Richard E.; Berglöf, Erik; Giavazzi, Francesco; Widgren, Mika (2001) “Nice Try: Should the 
Treaty of Nice be Ratified?”,  Centre For Economic Policy Research. 
Benedetto, Giacomo (2006) “The European Parliament: Consensus and Coordination for Enhanced 
Powers”.  In:  König,  Thomas;  Hug,  Simon  (eds.)  Preference  Formation  and  European 
Constitution-building.  A  Comparative  Study  in  Member  States  and  Accession  Countries. 
London: Routledge. 
Clinton, Joshua; Jackman, Simon; Rivers, Douglas (2004) “The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data”, 
American Political Science Review, 98(02), 355-370. 
Enelow,  James;  Hinich,  Melvin  (1984)  The  spatial  theory  of  voting:  an  introduction.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Finke,  Daniel  (2009a)  “Challenges  to  Intergovernmentalism:  An  Empirical  Analysis  of  EU  Treaty 
Negotiations since Maastricht”, West European Politics, Forthcoming. 
Finke,  Daniel  (2009b)  “Estimating  the  Effect  of  Non-Separable  Preferences  in  EU  Treaty 
Negotiations”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Forthcoming. 
Göler, Daniel; Marhold, H. (2003) „Die Konventsmethode“, Integration, 26(4), 317-330. 
Giering, Claus (2003) „Mutige   Einschnitte   und   verzagte   Kompromisse   –   das   institutionelle 
Reformpaket des EU-Konvents“. In: Giering, Claus (ed.) Der EU Reform-Konvent: Analyse und  
Dokumentation. Bertelsmann, Gütersloh. 
Han, Jeong-Hun (2007) “Analysing Roll Calls of the European Parliament: A Bayesian Application”, 
European Union Politics, 8(4), 479-507.  
Heinemann, Friedrich (2003) “The political economy of EU enlargement and the Treaty of Nice”, 
European Journal of Political Economy, 19(1), 17-31.   
Hinich, Melvin; Munger, Michael C. (1997) Analytical Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Hix, Simon; Noury, Abdul G.; Roland, Gérard (2007) Democratic Politics in the European Parliament. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Hix, Simon and Christophe Crombez (2005) “Extracting Ideal Point Estimates from Actors' Preferences 
on the EU Constitutional Negotiations”, European Union Politics, 6(3), 353-376.  
Hoyland, Bjorn; Hagemann, Sara (2008) “Parties in the Council?”, Journal of European Public Policy, 
15(8), 1205-1221. 
Hug, Simon; Thomas König (2002) “In View of Ratification: Governmental Preferences and  Domestic 
Constraints at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference”, International Organization, 
56(2), 447-76. 
Iida,  Keisuke  (1993)  “When  and  How  Do  Domestic  Constraints  Matter?  Two-Level  Games  with 
Uncertainty”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 37, 403-26. 
Iida, Keisuke (1996) “Involuntary defection in two-level games”, Public Choice, 89, 283-303.  
Johnson, Valen E.; Albert, James H. (1999) Ordinal Data Modeling. New York: Springer.  23 
Kim, Soo Yeon; Russett, Bruce (1996) "The new politics of voting alignments in the United Nations 
General Assembly", International Organization, 50(4), 629-52. 
König,  Thomas;  Slapin,  Jonathan  (2006)  “From  Unanimity  to  Consensus.  An  Analysis  of  the 
Negotiations at the EU's Constitutional Convention“, World Politics, 58(3), 413-445. 
König, Thomas; Hug, Simon (eds.) (2006) Preference Formation and European Constitution-building. A 
Comparative Study in Member States and Accession Countries. London: Routledge. 
König, Thomas; Finke, Daniel (2007) “Reforming the Equilibrium? Veto Players and Policy Change in 
the  European  Constitution-building  Process“,  Review  of  International  Organizations,  2(2), 
153-176. 
König, Thomas; Daniel Finke; Daimer, Stefanie (2008) “The Treaty Reform of the EU: Constitutional 
Agenda-Setting,  Intergovernmental  Bargains  and  the  Presidency's  Crisis  Management  of 
Ratification Failure“,  Journal of Common Market Studies, 46(2), 337-363.  
Lacy, Dean (2001) “A Theory of Nonseperable Preferences in Survey Responses”, American Journal of 
Political Science, 45(2), 239-258. 
Maurer, Andreas (2007) „Das Europäische Parlament in der Vertragsreform“, WeltTrends-Papiere, 2, 
35- 52. 
Martin, Andrew; Quinn, Kevin (2002) “Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999”, Political Analysis, 10, 134-153. 
Milton, G.; Keller-Noell, J.; Bartol-Saurel, A. (2005) The European Constitution: Its Origins, Negotiation 
and Meaning. London: John Harper Publishing. 
Moravcsik, Andrew (1998) The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose & State Power From Messina to 
Maastricht. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Norman, Peter (2003) The Accidental Constitution. The Story of the European Convention. Brussels:  
EuroComment. 
Pahre,  Robert  (1997)  “Endogenous  Domestic  Institutions  in  Two-Level  Games  and  Parliamentary 
Oversight”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(2), 147-174. 
Poole, Keith T.; Rosenthal, Howard (1997) Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Quinn,  Kevin  M.;  Jong  Hee,  Park  and  Martin,  Andrew  D.  (2006)  “Improving  Judicial  Ideal  Point 
Estimates with a More Realistic Model of Opinion Content”. Unpublished working paper. 
Schelling, Thomas C. (1960) The Strategy of Conflict. MA: Harvard University Press. 
Slapin, Jonathan B. (2008) “Bargaining Power at Europe’s Intergovernmental Conferences: Testing 
Institutional and Intergovernmental Theories”, International Organization, 62(1), 131-162. 
Tsebelis,  George  (2008)  “Thinking  about  the  Recent  Past  and  the  Future  of  the  EU”,  Journal  of 
Common Market Studies, 46(2), 265-292.  
Tsebelis,  George; Proksch,  Sven-Oliver (2007) “The Art of Political Manipulation in the European 
Convention”,  Journal of Common Market Studies, 45(1), 157-186. 
Voeten, Erik (2005) “The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of 
Force”, International Organization, 59(3), 527-57. 
Yataganas, Xenophon A. (2001) “The Treaty of Nice: The Sharing of Power and the Institutional 
Balance in the European Union-A Continental Perspective”, European Law Journal, 7(3), 242-
291.   
 24 
Table 1: Sequence of Intergovernmental Decisions 
Reform Issues (DOSEI- data collection)  Last Appearance in Official 
Document, Document ID 
Decisions until Final Summit under Irish Presidency (June 2004)    
QMV  18.06.2004, CIG 82-85/04 
Number of commissioners  18.06.2004, CIG 82-85/04 
Presidency of the European Council  18.06.2004, CIG 81/04 
Voting rule (council) for Tax harmonization  18.06.2004, CIG 81/04 
Voting rule (council) for  Common Foreign Policy  18.06.2004, CIG 81/04 
Rights of EP in the adoption of the budget  18.06.2004, CIG 81/04 
Charter of Fundamental Rights  18.06.2004, CIG 82-85/04 
Scope of ECJ jurisdiction  18.06.2004, CIG 81/04 
Level of competence for Structural and Cohesion policies  18.06.2004, CIG 84-85/04 
Level of competence for Freedom, Security and Justice  18.06.2004, CIG 81,83-85/04 
Level of competence for Economic Policy  18.06.2004, CIG 82-85/04 
Level of competence for Employment Policy  18.06.2004, CIG 82-85/04 
Level of competence for Social Policy  18.06.2004, CIG 81/04 
Voting rule (council) for Stability and Growth Pact  18.06.2004, CIG 82-85/04 
Religious reference in the preamble  14.06.2004, CIG 80/04 
Decision rule (EP) for Structural and Cohesion policies  24.05.2004, CIG 79/04 
Level of competence for Health Policy  24.05.2004, CIG 79/04 
Appointment of Commissioners (role of EP)  17.05.2004, CIG 75/04 
Voting rule (Council) for Area of Freedom, Security and Justice  17.05.2004, CIG 75/04 
Voting rule (Council) for Social security rights  17.05.2004, CIG 75/04 
Presidency of the European Council (nomination)  13.05.2004, CIG 76/03 
Appointment of Commission President (role of Council, EP or nat. parliaments)  13.05.2004, CIG 76/03 
Minister of Foreign Affairs (role of Commission in appointment)  13.05.2004, CIG 76/03 
Voting rule (Council) for Structural and Cohesion politics  13.05.2004, CIG 76/03 
Voting rule (Council) for Defense Policy  13.05.2004, CIG 76/03 
External representation  29.04.2004, CIG 73/04 
Decisions until Summit under Italian Presidency (December 2003)    
Enhanced cooperation  12.12.2003, CIG 60/1/03 
Level of competence for Tax harmonization  12.12.2003, CIG 60/1/03 
Voting rule (Council) for Social Policy  27.10.2003, CIG 38/03 
Voting rule (Council) for Defense Policy  27.10.2003, CIG 38/03 
Right to withdraw from the Union  27.10.2003, CIG 37/03 
Level of competence for Agriculture  27.10.2003, CIG 37/03 
Level of competence for Environment Policy  27.10.2003, CIG 37/03 
Level of competence for research, technological development & space  27.10.2003, CIG 37/03 
Migration and Asylum  27.10.2003, CIG 37/03 
Decisions taken in the Convention (until June 2003)    
Legislative initiative for citizens  12.06.2003, CONV 797/1/03 
Minister of Foreign Affairs (role of EP in appointment)  12.06.2003, CONV 797/1/03 
Economic objectives: competitiveness  12.06.2003, CONV 797/1/03 
Subsidiarity  30.05.2003, CONV 724/1/03 
Legislative initiative for Council  30.05.2003, CONV 727/03 
Voting rule (Council) for Monetary policy  30.05.2003, CONV 727/03 
Voting rule (Council) for Economic Policy  30.05.2003, CONV 727/03 
Decision rule (EP) for Area of freedom, security and justice  30.05.2003, CONV 727/03 
Decision rule (EP) for Tax harmonization  30.05.2003, CONV 727/03 
Decision rule (EP) for Monetary policy  30.05.2003, CONV 727/03 
Decision rule (EP) for Economic Policy  30.05.2003, CONV 727/03 
Decision rule (EP) for Common Foreign Policy  30.05.2003, CONV 727/03 
Decision rule (EP) for Defense Policy  30.05.2003, CONV 727/03 
External borders (management)  30.05.2003, CONV 727/03 
Economic objectives : market economy  30.05.2003, CONV 724/1/03 
Economic objectives : employment  30.05.2003, CONV 724/1/03 
Level of competence for Foreign Policy  15.05.2003, CONV 748/03 
Voting rule (council) for Agriculture  12.05.2003, CONV 729/03 
Voting rule (Council) for Internal market  12.05.2003, CONV 729/03 
Voting rule (Council) for Employment Policy  12.05.2003, CONV 729/03 
Decision rule (EP) for Agriculture  12.05.2003, CONV 729/03 
Decision rule (EP) for Internal market  12.05.2003, CONV 729/03 
Decision rule (EP) for Employment Policy  12.05.2003, CONV 729/03 
Decision rule (EP) for Social Policy  12.05.2003, CONV 729/03 
Decision rule (EP) for Social security rights  12.05.2003, CONV 729/03 
Legislative initiative Commission  24.04.2003, CONV 691/03 
Legislative initiative for European Parliament  24.04.2003, CONV 691/03 
Legislative initiative for National parliaments  24.04.2003, CONV 691/03 
Level of competence for Education Policy  06.02.2003, CONV 528/03 
Source: Data collection of the DOSEI-Project and own research (König and Finke 2007).  25 
 
Figure 1 Governmental Positions (conditional upon Treaty of Nice).  Figure 2 Governmental Positions (unconditional). 
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Figure 3 Governmental Positions (conditional upon the Convention  Figure 4 Governmental Positions (conditional upon minmal compromise  
Proposal).                  reached in June 2003; Note: unlabeled dots equal to Figure 1).     
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Figure 5 Governmental Positions (conditional upon the compromise  Figure 6 Governmental Positions (conditional upon minmal compromise  
reached in December 2003; Note: unlabeled dots equal to Figure 4).    reached in June 2004; Note: unlabeled dots equal to Figure 5).   
DecO3
AT
BE
CY
CZ
DK
EE
SF
FR
DE
GR
HU
IE
IT
LV
LT
LU
MT
NT
PL
PT
SK
SI
ES
SV
UK
ToN
Jun03
-
1
0
1
2
V
e
r
t
i
c
a
l
 
I
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
-2 -1 0 1 2
Decision Rule
JunO4 AT
BE
CY
CZ
DK
EE
SF
FR
DE
GR
HU
IE
IT
LV
LT
LU
MT
NT
PL
PT
SK
SI
ES
SV
UK
ToN
DecO3
-
1
0
1
2
V
e
r
t
i
c
a
l
 
I
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
-2 -1 0 1 2
Decision Rule28 
 
 
Figure 7 Governmental Positions (conditional upon the Constitutional Treaty; 
Note: unlabeled dots equal to Figure 6). 
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Note: 
AT=Austria; BE=Belgium; CY= Cyprus; CZ= Czech REpublic; DE= 
Germany; DK= Denmark; EE=Estonia; ES= Spain; FR=France; 
GR=Greece; HU=Hungary; IE= Ireland; IT=Italy; 
LU=Luxembourg; LV=Latvia;LT=Lithuania; MT=Malta; 
NT=Netherlands; PT=Portugal; PL=Poland; SI= Slovenia; SF= 
Finland; SK= Slovak Republic; SV=Sweden; UK=United Kingdom 
ToN= Treaty of Nice; IGC= Constitutional Treaty; Conv= 
Convention Proposal; Jun03= Compromise reached in June 
2003 (see Table 1); Dec03=Compromise reached in December 
2003 (see Table 1); Jun04 = Compromise reach in June 2004 
(see Table 1) 29 
Appendix  
A1: Complete list of item parameters. Mean of posterior distribution plus lower and upper bound of 
95% HPDs.  
lo95 mean up95 lo95 mean up95 lo90 mean up90 lo95 mean up95
Q1 Charter of Fundamental Rights -0,24 0,30 0,89 0,43 1,04 1,69 -1,13 -0,24 0,64 -1,39 -1,04 -0,70
Q2 Subsidiarity -0,87 -0,30 0,22 0,47 0,93 1,45 -0,34 0,36 1,08 0,58 0,88 1,21
Q3 Religious reference -0,19 0,10 0,38 0,35 0,67 1,02 -0,08 0,38 0,87 -0,24 0,04 0,32
Q4 Right to withdraw from the Union 0,21 0,53 0,90 0,28 0,62 1,00 -1,90 -1,24 -0,65 -1,46 -1,05 -0,70
Q5.A Economic objectives : market economy 0,35 0,84 1,40 0,00 0,48 0,98 -0,04 0,62 1,41 0,73 1,09 1,50
Q5.B Economic objectives : employment -0,30 -0,01 0,28 0,67 1,03 1,44 -1,39 -0,83 -0,30 0,76 1,08 1,46
Q5.C Economic objectives : competitiveness -0,75 -0,24 0,23 -0,32 0,19 0,69 -0,13 0,61 1,36 0,36 0,67 1,01
Q6
Presidency of the European Council 
(organization) -0,01 0,26 0,56 0,44 0,84 1,29 -0,28 0,22 0,67 -0,74 -0,48 -0,22
Q7
Presidency of the European Council 
(nomination) -1,07 -0,58 -0,16 0,16 0,55 1,00 -0,60 0,03 0,58 1,04 1,45 1,90
Q8 QMV 0,27 0,56 0,89 0,44 0,86 1,31 -0,19 0,27 0,75 -0,26 0,03 0,34
Q9 Number of commissioners 0,63 1,13 1,70 -0,31 0,13 0,57 -1,11 -0,42 0,32 -0,75 -0,40 -0,09
Q10
Appointment of Commission President 
(role of Council, EP or nat. 
parliaments) -0,58 -0,14 0,24 -0,34 0,06 0,46 -0,59 0,07 0,77 -1,05 -0,74 -0,45
Q11
Appointment of Commissioners (role of 
EP) 0,10 0,49 0,92 0,62 1,14 1,72 -1,65 -0,84 -0,12 0,38 0,66 0,96
Q12 External representation 0,16 0,52 0,99 0,44 0,87 1,33 -0,58 0,10 0,78 -0,70 -0,42 -0,15
Q13.a
Minister of Foreign Affairs (role of 
Commission in appointment) -0,06 0,54 1,21 0,25 0,87 1,55 -1,33 -0,50 0,30 0,45 0,80 1,21
Q13.b
Minister of Foreign Affairs (role of EP 
in appointment) -0,65 -0,29 0,05 -0,79 -0,35 0,06 -1,07 -0,40 0,22 -0,96 -0,65 -0,37
Q14 ECJ Jurisdiction -0,76 -0,37 -0,03 0,36 0,75 1,22 0,31 0,86 1,45 -1,81 -1,32 -0,90
Q15.B
Legislative initiative for European 
Parliament -1,41 -0,80 -0,25 0,13 0,62 1,12 -0,61 0,06 0,71 -1,56 -1,17 -0,83
Q15.C Legislative initiative for Council -0,30 0,13 0,56 -0,45 0,04 0,51 -0,92 -0,22 0,48 0,32 0,65 0,98
Q15.E Legislative initiative for citizens 0,15 0,49 0,86 0,24 0,66 1,14 -1,06 -0,42 0,20 0,54 0,89 1,29
Q16 Enhanced Cooperation 0,90 1,51 2,16 0,46 1,02 1,60 -0,98 -0,43 0,10 -0,63 -0,29 0,03
Q17.1 Level of Competence for Agriculture -0,64 -0,28 0,05 0,34 0,72 1,12 -1,49 -0,89 -0,32 0,66 1,07 1,51
Q17.2
Level of Competence for Structural and 
Cohesion Politics -1,25 -0,64 -0,09 0,67 1,18 1,75 -1,73 -0,89 -0,12 -1,95 -1,48 -1,06
Q17.3
Level of Competence for the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice 0,22 0,66 1,15 0,51 1,05 1,63 -1,24 -0,57 -0,12 -0,31 0,02 0,36
Q17.4
Level of Competence for Foreign 
Policy 0,41 0,89 1,45 0,68 1,26 1,88 -1,46 -0,71 0,03 0,07 0,35 0,64
Q17.5
Level of Competence for Economic 
Policy -0,34 0,07 0,46 0,83 1,36 1,99 -1,51 -0,75 -0,04 0,15 0,47 0,80
Q17.6
Level of Competence for Tax 
Harmonization -0,21 0,22 0,65 0,93 1,49 2,11 -1,39 -0,62 0,10 0,16 0,50 0,84
Q17.7
Level of Competence for Employment 
Policy -1,34 -0,70 -0,17 0,95 1,55 2,22 -1,26 -0,38 0,41 0,33 0,64 0,97
Q17.8 Level of Competence for Social Policy -0,49 -0,03 0,43 1,06 1,64 2,29 -1,37 -0,41 0,47 0,00 0,28 0,55
Q17.9 Level of Competence for Health Policy -0,29 0,07 0,43 0,45 0,91 1,44 -1,76 -0,98 -0,26 -0,16 0,10 0,37
Q17.10
Level of Competence for Environment 
Policy -1,49 -0,86 -0,30 0,81 1,35 1,94 -1,02 -0,22 0,48 0,02 0,32 0,63
Q17.11
Level of Competence for Education 
Policy -0,98 -0,42 0,08 0,69 1,19 1,75 -1,23 -0,38 0,35 0,72 1,11 1,61
Code Short Description
 1  2 q 
 30 
lo95 mean up95 lo95 mean up95 lo90 mean up90 lo95 mean up95
Q17.12
Level of Competence for Research, 
Technological Development & Space -0,04 0,41 0,86 0,90 1,49 2,13 -1,91 -1,13 -0,35 -1,89 -1,42 -1,01
Q18.A2
Voting rule (Council) for Structural and 
Cohesion Politics -0,31 0,25 0,87 0,01 0,66 1,34 -0,77 0,08 0,91 -0,64 -0,36 -0,09
Q18.A3
Voting rule (Council) for Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice -0,03 0,35 0,75 0,10 0,54 1,01 -0,60 0,07 0,77 0,29 0,60 0,95
Q18.A5
Voting rule (Council) for Tax 
Harmonization 0,65 1,18 1,79 0,37 0,93 1,52 0,04 0,83 1,76 -1,00 -0,66 -0,35
Q18.A6
Voting rule (Council) for Monetary 
policy -0,22 0,21 0,68 0,71 1,32 2,00 0,43 1,04 1,69 -0,56 -0,27 0,00
Q18.A7
Voting rule (Council) for Economic 
Policy -0,31 0,09 0,52 0,62 1,18 1,80 0,05 0,66 1,30 -1,74 -1,29 -0,90
Q18.A8
Voting rule (Council) for Employment 
Policy 0,24 0,90 1,62 0,49 1,18 1,87 -0,63 0,19 0,92 -0,69 -0,37 -0,09
Q18.A9 Voting rule (Council) for Social Policy 0,62 1,18 1,86 0,03 0,56 1,14 -0,09 0,57 1,32 -1,06 -0,72 -0,42
Q18.A10
Voting rule (Council) for Social  
Security Rights 0,10 0,52 1,02 0,63 1,22 1,83 0,48 1,17 1,92 0,17 0,46 0,75
Q18.A11
Voting rule (Council) for Common 
Foreign Policy 0,86 1,45 2,08 0,22 0,83 1,48 0,21 0,96 1,73 0,90 1,28 1,70
Q18.A12 Voting rule (Council) for Defense Policy 0,61 1,07 1,61 0,47 1,07 1,67 -0,38 0,36 1,16 0,91 1,29 1,70
Q18.B1 Decision rule (EP) for Agriculture -0,94 -0,50 -0,12 0,01 0,41 0,82 -1,06 -0,34 0,36 -1,76 -1,28 -0,89
Q18.B2
Decision rule (EP) for Structural and 
Cohesion Politics -0,79 -0,32 0,16 0,39 1,07 1,81 -1,29 -0,50 0,38 -0,50 -0,23 0,04
Q18.B3
Decision rule (EP) for Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice -0,49 -0,07 0,32 0,58 1,11 1,72 -0,76 -0,12 0,45 -1,63 -1,14 -0,73
Q18.B4 Decision rule (EP) for Internal Market -1,07 -0,52 -0,04 0,62 1,27 1,97 -0,62 0,23 1,05 0,49 0,82 1,17
Q18.B5
Decision rule (EP) for Tax 
Harmonization 0,01 0,47 0,99 1,13 1,77 2,44 0,06 0,73 1,45 -0,33 0,03 0,36
Q18.B6 Decision rule (EP) for Monetary policy -1,30 -0,67 -0,16 0,56 1,11 1,71 0,79 1,41 2,14 -0,25 0,13 0,50
Q18.B7 Decision rule (EP) for Economic Policy -1,75 -0,90 -0,30 0,46 1,03 1,66 1,06 1,71 2,42 -0,77 -0,45 -0,16
Q18.B8
Decision rule (EP) for Employment 
Policy -0,53 -0,10 0,32 0,76 1,35 1,98 0,06 0,63 1,29 -0,67 -0,40 -0,14
Q18.B9 Decision rule (EP) for Social Policy -0,06 0,31 0,75 0,38 0,89 1,47 0,00 0,59 1,25 -0,12 0,18 0,47
Q18.B10
Decision rule (EP) for Social Security 
rights -0,38 0,04 0,45 0,68 1,20 1,79 0,27 0,97 1,75 -0,76 -0,49 -0,23
Q18.B11
Decision rule (EP) for Common 
Foreign Policy -0,91 -0,32 0,21 0,56 1,04 1,57 -0,01 0,63 1,31 -0,72 -0,38 -0,07
Q18.B12 Decision rule (EP) for Defense Policy -0,85 -0,31 0,21 0,57 1,05 1,57 0,00 0,62 1,28 -1,13 -0,81 -0,52
Q19
Rights of EP in the adoption of the 
budget -0,22 0,01 0,23 -0,01 0,31 0,66 -0,75 -0,16 0,38 -1,19 -0,83 -0,51
Q20 SGP I (flexibility) -0,59 -0,26 0,04 -0,14 0,25 0,63 -1,16 -0,45 0,17 -0,64 -0,36 -0,09
Q21 SGP II (debt/ GDP criterion) -0,29 0,05 0,40 0,04 0,48 0,97 -1,44 -0,64 0,15 -1,92 -1,47 -1,08
Q22 Defense Cooperation 0,99 1,51 2,11 0,94 1,46 2,03 -0,92 -0,36 0,18 0,90 1,25 1,64
Q23 External Borders (management) 0,12 0,40 0,71 0,21 0,54 0,92 -1,27 -0,62 -0,02 -1,74 -1,30 -0,92
Q24 Migration and Asylum 0,64 1,00 1,42 0,21 0,62 1,07 -1,20 -0,64 -0,03 -0,08 0,17 0,42
mean -0,28 0,18 0,65 0,39 0,90 1,44 -0,70 0,00 0,68 -0,15 0,17 0,51
stdev 0,64 0,61 0,65 0,38 0,43 0,51 0,71 0,67 0,69 0,83 0,83 0,87
|mean| 0,54 0,50 0,70 0,46 0,89 1,40 0,82 0,56 0,74 0,77 0,70 0,72
Code Short Description
 1  2 q 31 
A2: Complete list of estimated person parameters. Mean of posterior distribution plus lower and 
upper bound of 90% HPDs. 
lo95 mean up95 lo95 mean up95 lo90 mean up90
Austria AT -0,035 0,447 0,978 0,078 0,356 0,614 0,410 0,970 0,394
Belgium BE 0,129 0,627 1,126 0,985 1,289 1,606 0,037 0,302 0,220
Cyprus CY -0,808 -0,296 0,180 0,219 0,450 0,732 -2,330 -1,505 -0,499
Czech Republic CZ -1,285 -0,817 -0,424 -0,004 0,229 0,483 -0,007 0,173 0,167
Denmark DK -1,226 -0,842 -0,486 -0,424 -0,164 0,107 -0,055 0,116 0,136
Estonia EE -0,727 -0,251 0,196 -1,009 -0,708 -0,426 -0,513 -0,293 -0,217
Finland SF 0,226 0,608 1,018 -0,200 0,062 0,295 -0,041 0,169 0,164
France FR 1,068 1,539 2,054 0,312 0,652 0,968 -0,046 0,097 0,124
Germany DE 0,975 1,431 1,943 -0,118 0,210 0,490 -0,107 0,024 0,062
Greece GR 0,220 0,837 1,474 1,512 1,916 2,416 -0,083 0,161 0,160
Hungary HU -0,490 -0,132 0,238 -0,634 -0,363 -0,126 0,108 0,581 0,305
Ireland IE -0,019 0,355 0,763 -1,273 -0,946 -0,656 -0,410 -0,146 -0,153
Italy IT 1,669 2,306 2,982 -0,942 -0,400 0,024 -0,184 -0,072 -0,107
Latvia LA -0,708 -0,367 -0,039 -0,248 -0,040 0,171 -0,136 0,101 0,127
Lithuania LT -0,240 0,109 0,457 -0,290 -0,085 0,112 -0,633 -0,331 -0,230
Luxembourg LU 0,280 0,666 1,082 0,147 0,366 0,588 -0,490 -0,263 -0,205
Malta MT -0,737 -0,357 0,021 -0,248 -0,028 0,209 -0,725 -0,434 -0,263
Netherlands NL -0,192 0,149 0,494 -0,204 0,006 0,201 -0,458 -0,077 -0,111
Poland PL -0,587 -0,243 0,099 -0,721 -0,482 -0,261 -0,123 0,110 0,133
Portugal PT 0,774 1,252 1,782 -0,584 -0,226 0,064 -0,204 -0,047 -0,087
Slovakia SK -1,620 -1,112 -0,653 0,884 1,237 1,686 -0,720 -0,432 -0,263
Slovenia SI -0,267 0,097 0,474 0,143 0,360 0,578 -0,072 0,294 0,217
Spain ES 0,344 0,704 1,126 -0,437 -0,185 0,056 -0,395 -0,161 -0,161
Sweden SV -0,601 -0,253 0,099 -0,198 0,007 0,224 0,117 0,641 0,320
United Kingdom UK 0,034 0,327 0,626 -0,210 -0,015 0,170 -0,180 0,039 0,078
mean -0,153 0,271 0,704 -0,139 0,140 0,413 -0,290 0,001 0,012
stdev 0,772 0,804 0,870 0,622 0,630 0,677 0,507 0,455 0,225
x1 x2 a12
 